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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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Applicant/Respondent, 
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Defendants/Applicants. 
No. 860091 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CHERNE CONSTRUCTION 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Industrial Commission erred when it 
determined that the "special hazard" exception to the "going 
and coming" rule applied in this case. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is 
dispositive or determinative of the case at hand. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case. This matter is before the Court on 
a Writ of Review of an Order of the Industrial Commission 
awarding benefits to the applicant, William Michael Posso, who 
was injured as a result of an automobile/motorcycle accident 
near the IPP Power Plant north of Delta, Utah. The applicant 
made a claim for worker's compensation benefits as a result of 
this accident and the injuries he received. Essentially, the 
applicant argued that he should be entitled to worker's 
compensation benefits because the injury occurred on his way 
home from work. Subsequently, the defendant Cherne 
Construction Company moved for a review of the Administrative 
Law Judgefs decision. The Order of the Industrial Commission 
denying the Motion for Review was passed by the Industrial 
Commission on the 16th day of January, 1986. As a consequence, 
this matter is before the Court on the Writ of Review. 
Statement of Facts. 
The applicant, William Michael Posso, was injured on 
August 4, 1984, in an automobile/motorcycle accident on Brush 
Wellman Road, in Millard County, Utah. (R. 27, 31-32) 
On the date of the accident, Mr. Posso was employed 
by Cherne Construction Corp., also known as Cherne 
Construction. (R. 2 6) 
The applicant was a construction laborer for Cherne 
Construction at the IPP Power Plant north of Delta, Utah, 
located just off the Brush Wellman Road. (R. 27) 
Approximately 3:30 p.m. on the date of the accident, 
the plaintiff completed his job duties at the IPP Plant. He 
turned in his employee badge at approximately 3:35 p.m. and was 
not intending to perform any other work duties that day. (R. 
28-29) 
The applicant then went to the parking lot to get on 
his motorcycle in order go home, to Delta, Utah,, He exited the 
IPP Plant and intended to travel east on Brush Wellman Road to 
where it intersects with highway 6. He then intended to travel 
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south on highway 6 to Delta. (R. 30, 40, 47) 
While traveling on Brush Wellman Road the applicant 
attempted to pass a vehicle which was turning left into the 
man-camp near the IPP Plant and subsequently the accident 
occurred. (R. 31-32) 
Brush Wellman Road is a public highway maintained by 
Millard County. (R. 66-67) 
The Brush Wellman Road at the entrance to the 
man-camp has been widened into a four (4) lane highway. (R. 
36-37) 
Brush Wellman Road was not the exclusive access to 
the IPP Plant. In fact, there were at least two other access 
roads to the plant. (R. 36, 39, 46-47) 
Brush Wellman Road was not used exclusively by 
workers at the IPP Plant nor did it pass through the IPP Plant 
itself. (R. 36, 39) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is only one major issue to be resolved in this 
particular case: Did the applicant, William Michael Posso, 
sustain his injury in the course of his employment? As stated 
above, it appears that Mr. Posso was injured on his motorcycle 
on his way home from work on August 4, 1984. It is the general 
rule that travel to and from work is not normally considered to 
be in the course of an employee's employment. There are, 
however, certain exceptions to this rule, which is commonly 
referred to as the "going and coming" rule. Specifically, an 
employee may recover worker's compensation benefits as a result 
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of an injury received while he is going or coming from work if 
the injury incurrs either "on the premises" of the employer or 
if the route which the employee must travel to and from work 
presents a "special hazard" to travel, thus becoming a special 
hazard of employment. It is undisputed in this case that the 
accident in question did not occur on the premises of the 
employer, Cherne Construction. Consequently, the only issue in 
this case is whether or not the "special hazard" exception to 
the "going and coming" rule applies. 
There are a number of cases in Utah which set out and 
explain the going and coming rule and the applicable exceptions 
to the rule. A careful examination of those cases yields the 
inescapable conclusion that there was no special hazard to Mr. 
Posso as contemplated by law. Further, it is apparent that Mr. 
Posso cannot satisfy all of the requirements of the special 
hazard test which has been set out by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Finally, extension of the "special hazard" exception to the 
facts of this case will enlarge the exceptions to the "going 
and coming" rule to the point that the exceptions swallow the 
rule. Specifically, to allow Mr. Posso to obtain workman's 
compensation benefits as a result of the accident in this case 
will in effect vitiate the going and coming rule. There can 
be, if benefits are extended in this case, no distinction 
between the accident in the case at hand and any other accident 
that an employee encounters on the way to or from his or her 
place of business as a result of congestion or a busy 
intersection. As a consequence, it would be improper for the 
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Court to sustain the finding of the Industrial Commission. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED WHEN IT 
DETERMINED THAT MR. POSSO WAS INJURED IN 
THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
A. History of the Special Hazard Exception. 
Unless the injuries of William Michael Posso can be 
considered to have arisen out of or in the course of his 
employment, workman's compensation benefits should be denied. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 (1953 as amended) specifically 
states that an employee is entitled to benefits if his injury 
is caused "by accident arising out of or in the course of his 
employment . . . ." The question in this case is whether or 
not his injury occurred during the course of his employment. 
The particular issue in this case is whether or not the 
circumstances surrounding Mr. Posso1s accident amount to an 
exception to what has been called the "going and coming" rule. 
Generally, workmen's compensation benefits are not afforded to 
employees injured while traveling to and from work. See, 
e.g. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 8 P.2d 
617, 618 (Utah 1932). There are however, some exceptions to 
the going and coming rule which have been recognized by the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
As long ago as 1938 the Supreme Court of this State 
has determined that if a workman was injured in the normal 
course of things, while going to or coming from his or her 
place of employment, such an accident was the result of the 
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general hazards which all must meet and assume and consequently 
was not in the course of employment. Vitagraph, Inc. v. 
Industrial Commission, 85 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1938). The 
Court in Vitagraph called this the "plant" rule; that is, 
under this rule the employee does not actually become attached 
to his employment until he arrives at the plant or place of his 
employment and he is not in employment after he leaves the 
plant or place of employment. Id.at 603. 
Two cases, Bountiful Brick Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 68 Utah 600 251 P.555, affirmed 276 U.S. 154, 48 
S. Ct. 221, 72 L. Ed. 507 (1927), and Cudahy Packing Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 161, 207 P.148, affirmed 263 
U.S. 418, 44 S. Ct. 143, and 68 L. Ed. 366 (1923), carve out an 
exception to the "going and coming" rule. In both Cudahy and 
Bountiful Brick Co., while on the way to work and within 100 
feet or less of the place of employment, the decedent in each 
case was struck and killed by a train. In both cases, the 
proximity of the risk to the place of employment and the fact 
that the risk was regularly encountered by the employees of the 
business, whereas the public encountered the risk only 
occasionally, were controlling. It appeared under the facts of 
Cudahy that it was necessary for each employee to enter the 
plant over a particular road, which was the only road leading 
to the plant. Evidently, the Court predicated its decision in 
Cudahy, allowing benefits, upon the inference that the danger 
incident to crossing the railroad track, by reason of its 
location and proximity to the packing plant and the necessity 
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of crossing it, must have been within the contemplation of the 
parties, that is the employer and the employee at the time of 
employee and as a incident thereto. Basically, the Court 
determined that the employer's control over the employee was 
extended beyond the actual confines of the plant to the road 
that the employee was required to use as a place of danger, 
that is the railroad track. 
A similar decision was reached in Bountiful Brick. 
In that case, the Court extended benefits to the decedent's 
dependants. The decedent crossed railroad tracks by foot to 
his place of business at a point where an opening in the 
plaintiff's fence was made in order to accommodate the ingress 
of plant employees. The Court stated that "by virtue of his 
employment [the employee] was . . . peculiarly and abnormally 
exposed to a common peril." Obviously, the Court determined 
that by being forced to cross a railroad track between fences 
on a daily basis the decedent was regularly exposed to a perial 
not encountered by the public at large. It is interesting to 
note that in both Bountiful Brick and Cudahy, the decedents 
were struck and killed by a train while on their way to work 
and within 100 feet or less of their place of employment. In 
both cases, the proximity of the risk to the place of 
employment and the fact that the risk was regularly encountered 
by the employees of the business, whereas the public 
encountered the risk only occasionally, were controlling. 
However, this Court has more recently clarified the 
"special hazard" exception to the going and coming rule in the 
7 
case of Soldier Creek Coal Co, v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 
1985). In that case the claimant's deceased, Mr. Bailey, was 
employed by a coal company 17 miles from his home in Price, 
Utah. There was only one road leading to the mine. From the 
mine the road continued on to Myton and serviced a number of 
ranches on that portion of the road. At any rate, the 
plaintiff was thrown from his pickup truck less than a third of 
a mile from the place of employment. The claimant alleged that 
the accident occurred because of a special hazard imposed by 
the road that serviced the mine site. Specifically, the 
Industrial Commission concluded that the condition of the road, 
which consisted of an inclined sharp right hand curve, posed a 
special hazard of employment. As a consequence, it determined 
that the accident was compensable. The Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah reversed and in so doing set out the elements of 
the "special hazard" exception to the going and coming rule 
which must be met before an accident can be considered 
compensable. 
The Court determined that: 
The commonest ground of extension [of the 
premises rule] is that the off-premises 
point at which the injury occurred lies on 
the only route, or at least on the normal 
route, which employees must traverse to 
reach the plant, and therefore the special 
hazards of the route become the hazards of 
employment. 
Id. at 1166, citing 1 A. Larsen, The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation §15.13 (1985). The Court went on to set out 
the four requirements that must be met before the special 
hazards exception to the going and coming rule can be met. 
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First, there must be a close association between the route 
taken by the employee and the employer's premises, which 
usually means that the route must be the "only" route to the 
work place. Second, there must be an identifiable special 
hazard associated with the route. Third, the employee must be 
exposed to the special hazard as a result of his use of that 
route. Finally, the special hazard must be the proximate cause 
of the accident. The claimant simply cannot meet any of the 
requirements set out above. 
B. The Special Hazard Exception Does Not 
Apply to this Case. 
As stated in Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 
supra., at 1166, there is a four-prong test that must be 
satisfied. The first prong of that test is that "there must be 
a close association of the access way with the employer's 
premises, usually meaning that it must be the only route to the 
work place . . . ." It was well established at the hearing of 
this matter that in fact there were at least two other routes 
available to enter or leave at the IPP Plant. Although Cherne 
Construction concedes that the Brush Wellman Road was the most 
normally used access route to the IPP Plant, it does not 
concede that there is such a close association with the IPP 
Plant, as contemplated under Utah law, as to bring it within 
the special hazard exception to the going and coming rule. 
Specifically, although the Brush Wellman Road was the primary 
access point to the IPP Plant itself the Brush Wellman Road 
also was used by workers from other businesses on the road as 
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well as the general public. What is particularly interesting 
about this case and what militates against the claimant's 
assertion that the highway has a close association with the 
employer's premises is the fact that the accident in question 
occurred at a place on the highway which had absolutely no 
connection whatsoever to the means of ingress or egress to the 
claimant's place of employment. The facts were otherwise in 
Cudahy and Bountiful Brick; supra. 
The second prong of the test as set out in Soldier 
Creek Coal Company v. Bailey, is that "there must be a special 
hazard associated with this route . . . ." Id. cit 1166. 
Notwithstanding the finding of the Administrative Law Judge 
that there was a special hazard and notwithstanding the 
concurrence of the Industrial Commission with the 
Administrative Law Judge in denying the defendant's Motion for 
Review, no special hazard, as contemplated under Utah law, 
existed. Specifically, the Administrative Law Judge found that 
there was a hazard created by the employment itself. The 
Administrative Law Judge stated in her discussion that: 
"[t]he applicant would not have been 
traveling on that heavily congested road 
for any reason but to go to or depart from 
his employment. . . . No matter what road 
the applicant chose to take back to Delta, 
he would still have been subjected at some 
point to the heavy traffic on the Brush 
Wellman Road along the IPP site. The fact 
that the applicant was actually struck by 
another IPP employee turning into the 
employer owned man-camp is another 
consideration to which the Administrative 
Law Judge gives considerable weight. The 
Administrative Law Judge is satisfied that 
there is a distinct causal connection 
between the condition under which the 
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applicant had to leave the premises and 
the occurrence of the injury, and feels 
that it would be a grave injustice not to 
extend coverage in this matter." (R. 123) 
These statements by the Administrative Law Judge are in direct 
contravention to the testimony of the applicant himself. The 
applicant was asked: 
Q: How was traffic that afternoon? 
A: It was light. 
Q: The traffic was light, but there was other traffic on 
the road; is that right? 
A: That's correct. 
Beyond the fact that there was other traffic on the 
road consisting of some other employees from the IPP Plant, 
there was no showing whatsoever that the traffic was unusually 
heavy or that it presented any special hazard. The 
Administrative Law Judge's findings as well as the findings of 
the Industrial Commission are completely gratuitous, just as 
the findings of the Industrial Commission in Soldier Creek 
Coal Company v. Bailey, supra. were gratuitous. In that 
case, the Court overturned the commission's ruling that the 
deceased was exposed to a "special hazard" because he was 
killed when his vehicle overturned on a graded sharp turn. 
Likewise, in that case, the commission noted that it was common 
knowledge that roads to and from coal mines were normally 
covered with loose coal and debris and that under those 
circumstances it was clear that the claimant's death was a 
result of a special hazard presented by the road to the mine. 
The Supreme Court reversed and noted that there were no 
findings to support the evidence, likewise, there are no 
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findings of fact in this case which would support the 
Administrative Law Judge's finding that there was a special 
hazard associated with the route. Further, the Industrial 
Commission itself stated that there is no Utah law on whether 
heavy traffic can be considered a special hazard. The 
Commission determined unilaterally, without considering other 
factors, that the applicant was exposed to a "special hazard." 
Such a finding is not supported by the evidence,, 
The third prong of the test states that "the employee 
must be exposed to the special hazard because of his use of the 
route . . . ." Id. at 1166. Assuming that there was a 
special hazard associated with the route, and assuming that 
that special hazard was the congested nature of the Brush 
Wellman Road, then the applicant clearly falls short of 
satisfying the third requirement of the special hazard 
exception to the going and coming rule. By the applicant's own 
testimony, as stated above, traffic on that particular 
afternoon on the Brush Wellman Road was in the applicant's 
words, "light." (R. 31). No other argument on this particular 
point is required. The fact is, Mr. Posso was not exposed to 
any special hazard. 
Finally, the fourth prong of the test as set out by 
this Court is that "the special hazard must be the proximate 
cause of the accident." Id. at 1166. Again, the claimant, 
William Michael Posso, cannot meet his burden by showing that 
the special hazard was the proximate cause of the accident. 
The facts are undisputed, the applicant states: 
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As I got approximately, oh, 100 to 150 
yards away from the car, I noticed that it 
was slowing almost to a stop and the 
blazer was still on my right and I could 
not go into the other lane, so I attempted 
to pass the car on the left and as I 
turned into the west bound lane to go 
around the car, it turned into me. 
(R.32). As stated before, the facts show that William Michael 
Posso was following another vehicle in the inside east bound 
lane on the Brush Wellman Road leaving work. The vehicle in 
front of him slowed down in order to turn into the man-camp. 
The vehicle beside him did not allow Michael Posso to move over 
to the right in order to pass the car in front of him. As a 
consequence, Mr. Posso determined that he would pass the 
vehicle on its left. The exhibits D3, D4 and D5, which are 
part of the record on appeal, clearly show Brush Wellman Road 
at the entrance to the man-camp. Those photographs also show 
that the four-lane highway is divided by a double yellow line 
in the middle. Mr. Posso clearly improperly attempted to pass 
the vehicle that was slowing down in front of him. It cannot 
possibly be stated that heavy traffic or a congested Brush 
Wellman Road were the proximate cause of the applicant's 
injuries. As a consequence, it is clear, particularly in light 
of Soldier Creek Coal Company v. Bailey, supra, that the 
applicant cannot show a "special hazard" exception to the going 
and coming rule. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant, Cherne Construction, urges this Court 
to reverse the decision of the Industrial Commission on the 
grounds that there is no applicable exception to the going and 
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coming rule and upon the policy grounds to allow benefits in 
this case would eliminate a reasonable and well established 
rule in the State of Utah. 
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